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"The political clarity of contemporary humanitarian imperatives, in the 
face of traditional appeals to national interest, highlights an important 
emerging new feature of international relations: the pivotal role that can 
be played by civil society armed with new technologies of 
communication."1 2
Introduction
Student protestors inside the occupied national Parliament compound reporting 
online to the world from laptop computers epitomized the extent to which forces 
opposing President Suharto mobilized the internet in the dying phase of his rule.3 So
1 Research for this paper was part of a broader project on "The Internet and Democracy in Indonesia/' 
funded by an Australia Research Council Grant and undertaken jointly with Krishna Sen (Curtin 
University, Western Australia), who has contributed enormously to my understanding of this topic, but 
who shares no responsibility for this particular paper's many shortcomings. I would like to thank 
Professor Ben Arps, who convened a symposium "Media Cultures in Indonesia/Budaya Media di 
Indonesia" at Leiden University in April 2001, at which an early draft was presented. Thanks also to Herb 
Feith, John Waddingham, and Charles Schemer for valuable comments on earlier versions. All 
responsibility for the many remaining limitations is mine.
2 Wade Huntley and Peter Hayes, "East Timor and Asian Security," in Bitter Flowers, Sweet Flowers: East 
Timor, Indonesia, and the World Community, ed. Richard Tanter, Mark Selden, and Stephen R. Shalom 
(Sydney: Pluto Press Australia, 2001), pp. 173-188 (quotation from p. 183).
3 See, for example, the chapter "The Internet: Virtual Politics," in Krishna Sen and David T. Hill, Media, 
Culture and Politics in Indonesia (Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 2000), pp. 194-217.
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too, under Suharto's successors, is the internet proving a new medium for separatist 
and minority ethnic groups within the archipelago seeking self-determination or 
international recognition for their aspirations. "The most important factor in gaining 
independence is communication with international powers," claimed one Acehnese 
separatist leader, who added, "The Internet is the only way we can achieve this."4 
They are staking their claim on the internet, with several sites like "Achehnese tears" 
providing "information on breaches of human rights in Aceh," complete with graphic 
photographs of military brutality.5 Moluccan groups, too, both in Indonesia and 
abroad, have taken to the internet to argue their position on the recent conflict there.6 
This paper examines how one particular marginalized regional independence 
movement has exploited the potential of the internet in its struggle. East Timor7 
provides a striking example of how a protracted independence struggle adjusted to the 
new strategic possibilities of the internet, how these new technological possibilities 
could exert international political leverage, and how they can be applied by a nation 
on the path to independence.
Much has been written about the movement for an independent East Timor.8 Less 
analysis has focused on the strategies, and particularly the technologies, employed in 
the international diplomatic lobbying that accompanied the local guerrilla resistance.9 
Writings abound on the history and use of the internet. Less commonly has attention 
strayed to the history, and the incorporation, of internet technologies within specific 
states beyond North America and Europe, within the context of particular social and 
political conflicts. This paper is not a detailed history of the local struggle in East 
Timor, but will attempt to plot the incorporation of internet (and related) technologies 
into that struggle. It then discusses how the internet provided a unique opportunity for 
East Timor to claim "independence in cyberspace" as part of a spectrum of intemet-
4 Muhammad Nazar, the chairperson of Sira, an Acehnese group pressing for a self-determination 
referendum, is quoted in "Dateline—Internet: A virtual front line," AsiaWeek, June 21,2001, located via 
http://web3.infotrac.galegroup.com/itw (accessedAugust 3,2001).
5 At http:/ /members.tripod.com/Achehnese (accessed September 2,1999).
6 In "Consumers as Citizens in the Information Economy: Notes on the Internet in Indonesia" (forthcoming 
2002), Krishna Sen and I look at a Moluccan e-group, AMBONnet.
7 From July 17,1976 to October 20,1999, the disputed territory of East Timor was claimed by Indonesia as 
its twenty-seventh province. The United Nations (Decolonization Committee, Security Council or General 
Assembly) never recognized this annexation into Indonesia. Indonesia relinquished its claims after 78.5 
percent of the East Timorese effectively voted in favor of independence (by rejecting the Indonesian offer of 
autonomy) in a United Nations-sponsored "Popular Consultation" on August 30,1999. The name for the 
territory in the Tetun lingua franca is Timor Loro Sa'e, but the more common English "East Timor" is used 
throughout this paper.
8 A brief bibliography of material related to East Timor appears on http ://www.ci.uc.pt/Timor/bib- 
html.htm (accessed August 10,2001). This does not include the numerous books published in Australia 
about East Timor since the August 30,1999 referendum, several of which are cited later in this paper.
9 See Grayson J. Lloyd, "The Diplomacy on East Timor: Indonesia, the United Nations and the International 
Community," in Out of the Ashes: Destruction and Reconstruction of East Timor, ed. James J. Fox and Dionisio 
Babo Soares (Adelaide: Crawford House Publishing, 2000), pp. 79-105. Lloyd provides an overview of the 
diplomatic negotiations, but does not comment on the technologies employed. Similarly, Eilfs Weird and Peter 
Carey, 'The East Timor Issue in the Context of EU-Indonesian Relations, 1975-99," Indonesia and the 
Malay World 29,83 (2001): 51-74.
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related activist strategies, sometimes dubbed "hactivism." In the final section, the 
paper traces the role of the internet and other new technologies in the months before 
and after the August 30,1999 United Nations-sponsored referendum.
The study is thus an attempt at a(n albeit partial) technological history of East 
Timor's resistance movement, examining how political strategies and the new 
telecommunication technologies converge in the service of the struggle. This 
examination supports the fundamental argument that it is not the technology of the 
internet that ultimately determines its political possibilities, but the particular local 
political contexts to which the internet is brought to bear. As Huntley and Hayes have 
argued, in the hands of civil society, such technologies now play a pivotal role in 
international relations.
The Battle for Information
East Timor's independence struggle can be plotted alongside the history of the new 
computer-mediated technologies themselves. On October 6,1975, in the year Bill Gates 
and Paul Allen licensed their BASIC computer language and founded Micro-Soft 
(before they dropped the hyphen), Indonesian "volunteers" attacked the East Timor 
border region village of Batugade. The year 1975 thus marked both the birth of the 
personal computer revolution that formed the basis of the internet's open future10 and, 
for East Timor, the beginning of one of the most brutal covert international invasions of 
the second half of the twentieth century. It was not until two months later, on 
December 7,1975, that Indonesian forces officially entered East Timor; this operation 
took place barely a week after the primary pro-independence party, Fretilin, declared 
the territory's independence on November 28. But, within ten days of the initial 
October 6 attack by Indonesian irregulars on Batugade, five Australia-based 
journalists had been targeted and killed in the aftermath of an assault on Balibo by a 
"mixed force of 3,600 Kopassanda  (Indonesian commandos) and Timorese 
supporters."11
Australian Labor Prime Minister Gough Whitlam heard of the murders within 
about ten hours from Australian intelligence agencies monitoring Indonesian military 
signals. But having been informed the same day that the Liberal opposition in the 
Parliament's upper house planned to block supply of monies to his government and 
starve it of funds, Whitlam and his senior ministers accepted intelligence advice that 
they refrain from publicly admitting knowledge of the deaths. The Indonesian military 
was determined to control the flow of information out of East Timor, and it happened 
that neighboring governments, most notably Australia's, colluded in helping them 
maintain this silence, for they routinely withheld intelligence in their possession unless 
such information had become public through other means. For much of the next
10 See C. J. P. Moschovitis, H. Poole, T. Schuyler, and T. M. Senft, History of the Internet: A Chronology, 1843 
to the Present (Santa Barbara: ABC-CLIO, 1999), particularly Chapter 3.
11A summary detailing Australian government knowledge of the attack on Balibo is given in East Timor: 
Final Report of the Senate Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade References Committee (Canberra: The 
Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia, December 2000), pp. 133-135. The most revealing analysis of 
this event can be found in Desmond Ball and Hamish McDonald, Death in Balibo, Lies in Canberra (St. 
Leonards: Allen & Unwin, 2000).
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twenty-four years, in their public posture, successive Australian governments 
appeared not to know anything unless the Indonesian government made it public first. 
The belated media revelation of the journalists' fate focused international attention on 
this largely unreported half-island and insured that the media—at least the Australian 
media—was periodically to return to the subject for the next quarter century.12 These 
deaths were but one of several reasons why Australia was to play a leading role in 
international public and media coverage of East Timor. Simple proximity, together 
with a historical memory of the sacrifice paid by East Timorese protecting Australian 
soldiers against Japanese attacks in World War II, also helped draw the attention of 
the Australian media to East Timor, as did the presence in Australia of a growing East 
Timorese refugee community.
The logistics faced by the five ill-fated journalists illustrated how difficult 
communications were in 1975. "The only way of getting a message out of Balibo was 
for someone to carry it by road," wrote Desmond Ball and Hamish McDonald, as the
Fretilin troops in Balibo had no radio. There was no telephone line. From Maliana 
[twenty kilometers east and forty-five minutes by road] a single phone line ran to 
another town further into East Timor, from where telephone calls were relayed by 
radio link to Dili. Maliana also had Fretilin's nearest radio post. A telephone 
service also linked Atabae, on the north coast, with Dili, but this town was 
several hours drive from Balibo.13
In the months preceding the Indonesian invasion, Fretilin's military wing, Falintil, 
maintained its own radio communications network, but made extensive use of the 
civilian telephone network (which used some wire connections, but mainly radio relay), 
both of which were subject to interception by Indonesian military signals intelligence.14
During the next twenty-four years of struggle against Indonesian occupation, the 
primary strategic concern of the East Timorese pro-independence guerrillas was 
survival against a far stronger and better-equipped occupation force. The guerrillas 
were supported by their designated representatives abroad, notably Jose Ramos- 
Horta, who, since his arrival at the United Nations Organization in New York on 
December 11, 1975, traveled the world to maximize international protest against the 
Indonesian invasion of East Timor. The movement was supported abroad by a 
committed, if sometimes chaotic, array of sympathetic groups, non-governmental 
organizations, and individuals, who agitated on behalf of self-determination for East
12 A chronology of events relating to East Timor for the years 1974-1976 is given in Wendy May, ed., 
Documents on Australian Foreign Policy: Australia and the Indonesian Incorporation of Portuguese Timor, 
1974-1976 (Melbourne: Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade & Melbourne University Press, 2000), pp. 
xvii-xxix. The Australian Broadcasting Commission broadcast initial reports of the journalists "missing in 
the region" on the morning of October 17,1975; other outlets quickly took up the story, particularly TV 
Channels 7 and 9, employers of the missing journalists. In Indonesia Kompas first reported the deaths on 
October 20. See May, Documents on Australian Foreign Policy, pp. 479,481,491. For a study of how the 
Australian media covered East Timor, see Rodney Tiffen, Diplomatic Deceits: Government, Media and East 
Timor (Sydney: University of New South Wales Press, 2001).
13 Ball and McDonald, Death in Balibo, pp. 44-45.
14 Ibid., pp. 55-64. This source provides details of Fretilin and Falintil communication methods and 
Indonesian interception of these during October 1975.
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Timor. During at least the first fifteen years of their campaign, a crucial challenge for 
such activists was securing access to information about what was happening in East 
Timor itself.15
It was an often insurmountable challenge, for "Few countries in the contemporary 
era have been so hermetically sealed as East Timor was in the years following the 
invasion ."16 Pro-independence forces experienced considerable difficulty in 
communicating with the outside world—or even broadcasting information within East 
Timor. Dili's civilian telecommunications hub, the Marconi Center, was one of the first 
targets for destruction by the invading forces. The local Dili radio station, which had 
been broadcasting as Radio Fretilin or Radio Maubere, was quickly captured by 
Indonesian forces, whose broadcast announced: "Fretilin is no more. Radio Maubere is 
dead . . .  Long live the people of East Timor with the Republic of Indonesia!"17 Several 
American-made World War II portable radio transceivers, left by the Portuguese Army, 
together with some later model pack radios, and transceivers supplied several weeks 
earlier from Darwin by Australian sympathizers,18 were carried off by the guerrilla 
forces. Despite constant difficulties maintaining these mobile radio units, they were 
capable of transmitting to northern Australia from the resistance's mountain retreats 
and were used regularly for messages over three years. The messages to Australia— 
which, when necessary, were sent using a primitive (and ultimately ineffective) code in 
an attempt to maintain secrecy—were then taped, transcribed, and either phoned (or, 
from March 1976, telexed) to key Fretilin contacts in Mozambique, Portugal, and 
elsewhere. (This painstaking and expensive procedure contrasted starkly with the 
efficiency of the instantaneous, secret transmissions possible after the adoption of 
encrypted e-mail in the early 1990s.) The efficacy of the radio link depended on the 
existence of mobile radio reception and transmission equipment being used by the 
Campaign for an Independent East Timor (CIET) in Australia's Northern Territory. 
While it was permissible to receive messages, it was illegal to transmit from Australia 
without a license, which the Australian government steadfastly refused to issue. 
Instead, after a long-running cat-and-mouse chase, the government eventually 
succeeded in confiscating the CIET equipment. Within East Timor, the surrender in 
December 1978 of Fretilin's minister for information and internal security led to the 
seizure of Fretilin's transmission equipment and the severing of its vital radio link to 
the world outside.19
Pro-independence forces had other ways of circumventing the Indonesian 
government's blanket of silence over East Timor, including through family or church 
contacts. Throughout the 1980s, following the cessation of radio contact, letters and 
messages detailing human rights abuses and military clashes (which were sometimes 
scrawled on the tom-out pages of school exercise books) were smuggled out of the 
territory. Once information had been secreted out of East Timor, international support
15 Personal communication with John Waddingham, co-founder/editor of Timor Information Service 
(Australia), (1975-84), by telephone, Perth, March 12, 2001.
16 Tiffen, Diplomatic Deceits, p. 27.
17 Quoted in Ball and McDonald, Death in Balibo, p. 177.
18 This supply and maintenance of radio contact during 1975-78 is vividly described in Denis Freney, A 
Map of Days: Life on the Left (Melbourne: William Heinemann Australia, 1991), pp. 354-373.
19 Ball and McDonald, Death in Balibo, pp. 177-180.
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groups actively disseminated it through any means available, to the media, to 
sympathizers, and to like-minded political organizations around the world. Such 
material occasionally made it into the mass media, but its veracity was questioned by 
the Indonesian government.20 Third-party verification was virtually impossible. As 
new technologies became available, they were readily used. A small number of satellite 
phones was smuggled into the territory. One, reportedly brought into the territory by a 
Japanese activist, was used by Falintil Commander Konis Santana21 (until it broke in 
1995). Maintenance of equipment was a constant problem.
However, the "opening up" of East Timor by the Suharto regime in January 1989 
did facilitate greater flow of information and intrepid investigators across the 
borders.22 The first demonstration to capture international media attention took place 
when banners were unfurled at an open-air Mass being celebrated by Pope John Paul 
during a visit to Dili in October 1989. One striking success was Robert Domm's 
September 1990 interview with the leader of the National Council of Maubere 
Resistance (CNRM) in the mountains of Ainaro; this interview introduced Xanana 
Gusmao to the outside world and demonstrated that the resistance movement had a 
powerful intelligence apparatus capable of outwitting its Indonesian counterpart.23
During the years of East Timor's imposed silence, computer-mediated 
communication technology was advancing steadily. In 1979, the first two American 
campuses were linked via phone line by Usenet, "a multidisciplinary computer 
network of news and discussion groups." Within a few years, Usenet connections 
extended to Europe and Australia, and the subject-based "newsgroups" organized on 
the Usenet grew to cover an ever-wider range of topics, although most of the sixty 
thousand Usenet users were still in military installations, universities, or technology 
corporations. By the time Indonesia "opened up" East Timor in 1989, civilian 
networks were emerging that allowed a general consumer, using a common networking 
protocol (known as TCP/IP24), to create what was collectively known as the 
"internet."25 In 1990, the newsgroup "reg.easttimor" was started by several activists 
and human rights groups, using the Alliance for Progressive Communications (APC) 
system as a medium. APC (which included member networks such as PeaceNet and
201 would like to thank Pat Walsh, formerly of the Australian Council for Overseas Aid, for discussing the 
methods used by Australian supporters of an independent East Timor, March 13,2001.
21 Konis Santana was field commander of Falintil, the military arm of the resistance movement, until his 
accidental death in late 1997. See John Martinkus, A Dirty Little War (Sydney: Random House Australia, 
2001), p. 244.
22 On the opening up of 1989-91, see Herb Feith, "East Timor: The Opening up, the Crackdown and the 
Possibility of a Durable Settlement," in Indonesia Assessment 1992: Political Perspectives on the 1990s, ed. 
Harold Crouch and Hal Hill, Political and social change monograph No. 17 (Canberra: ANU, 1992), pp. 63- 
80.
23 Domm entered East Timor briefly in January 1989, very soon after the territory was opened up to 
visitors, and returned again in September 1990 to interview Gusmao for the Australian Broadcasting 
Corporation's "Background Briefing" radio program. See Mark Aarons and Robert Domm, East Timor: A 
Western Made Tragedy (Sydney: New Left Book Club, 1992), and Tiffen, Diplomatic Deceits, pp. 51-52.
24 TCP/IP refers to "Transmission Control Protocol/Internet Protocol" which drives the internet. See 
Angus J. Kennedy, The Rough Guide to the Internet (London: Rough Guides, 2000), p. 481.
25 Moschovitis et al., History of the Internet, pp. 109,126.
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GreenNet) "provided the wires, but the initiative, content, and promotion was all done 
by NGOs and individuals," including Tapol: The Indonesian Human Rights Campaign 
in the UK and groups in the USA which later coalesced in the East Timor Action 
Network (ETAN/US).26 This facility enabled e-mailed information about the East 
Timor situation to be disseminated around the world to like-minded organizations. In 
Australia and elsewhere, key activists were beginning to recognize the potential of this 
technology. By 1991, Usenet was hosting more then 35,000 nodes, producing nearly ten 
million words of discussion daily.27
In another path-breaking innovation, researchers in the European Laboratory for 
Particle Physics (CERN) revolutionized the linkage, storage, and retrieval of 
information (using HTTP, HTML, and URL as building blocks28). From its introduction 
in 1991, this system, called the World Wide Web (WWW), together with the 
"browsers" and "search engines" that soon followed, enabled users to gain rapid 
access to vast, virtually unlimited, amounts of data. Once information was entered on 
the internet, the WWW made possible rapid retrieval from any linked computer.29 30The 
internet had become, in the term popularized by future US vice-president A1 Gore in 
1990, an "Information Superhighway." Its application grew exponentially; use of the 
original WWW server at CERN increasing tenfold per annum between 1991 and 
1994.3° By 1994, the underground resistance was beginning to use e-mail from inside 
East Timor, corresponding clandestinely to avoid detection by the Indonesian military. 
For the most part, however, the fledgling technology remained rare within East Timor; 
in the early 1990s, more conventional methods were generally being used to pass on 
information (and materiel) between the guerrillas and underground supporters in 
Indonesia (like the National Resistance of East Timorese Students, RENETIL, founded 
in 1986) and abroad (like the various human rights and East Timor lobby groups).31 
Even internationally, for the vast majority of independence supporters, "snail mail," 
fax, and phone remained the most common means of communication.
The Indonesian government's gradual enhancement of the telecommunications 
infrastructure in the territory provided some benefits for those wishing to breach the
26 Charles Scheiner, personal communication, September 7,2001. Scheiner was one of the founding sponsors 
of reg.easttimor.
27 Moschovitis et al., History of the Internet, pp. 102-103.
28 HTTP ("Hyper-Text Transfer Protocol") is for web text transfer, while HTML ("Hyper-Text Markup 
Language") is used to make web documents, and URL ("Uniform Resource Locator") is the formal name for 
a Web address.
29 Moschovitis et al., History of the Internet, p. 127.
30 Ibid., p. 153.
31 For a graphic description of the underground in East Timor and its links with sympathizers abroad, see 
Constancio Pinto and Matthew Jardine, East Timor's Unfinished Struggle: Inside the Timorese Resistance 
(Boston: South End Press, 1997), particularly pp. 92-134. On RENETIL, see Quentiliano Mok, "The Role of 
RENETIL: National Resistance of East Timorese Students," in East Timor Relief Association (ETRA), It's 
Time to Lead the Way (Collingwood: ETRA, 19%), pp. 106-108. For a more comprehensive list of 
underground resistance groups, see Donaciano Gomes, "Resistance: Twenty Years of Struggle Supported by 
Young East Timorese," in ETRA, It's Time to Lead the Way, pp. 115-120. Member organizations of the 
International Federation for East Timor (IFET) are listed at http:/ /etan.org/ifet/member.html, while an 
updated "List of East Timor Support and Solidarity Groups Worldwide" is at 
http://etan.org/ifet/support.html (accessed August 29,2001).
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information cordon. Corroborating details of the November 12, 1991 Santa Cruz 
massacre were transmitted out of East Timor by telephone calls to supporters and 
international aid organizations like the Red Cross in Jakarta and elsewhere, reinforcing 
reports from foreign journalists who had fled East Timor after witnessing the 
m assacre.32 Accounts were subsequently disseminated around the world via 
newsgroups like "reg.easttimor" and mailing lists like John MacDougall's apakabar 33 
But it was the potent images of the massacre filmed in the cemetery on a micro-camera 
by Max Stahl, the striking photographs by Steve Cox, and the vivid descriptions by 
journalist Allan Naim, that distilled the brutality of East Timor into a single graphic 
event for the international mass media. Cut into sound bites, screened repeatedly 
around the world, Stahl's footage of the Santa Cruz massacre reinvigorated the pro­
independence movement abroad and brought the campaign back into the mainstream 
mass media. In the words of Jakarta-based Australian journalist Michael Maher,
The capturing of this atrocity on film represented a major turning point for East 
Timor. No longer could the leaders of the Western world conveniently turn a 
blind eye to the suffering in this remote half-island perched on the outer reaches 
of the Indonesian archipelago. Stahl's footage defied them to turn away.34
The profiling of Xanana Gusmao, his capture by Indonesian forces in November 
1992, and subsequent trial attracted further media attention.35 He provided a sharp 
focus for both television and press coverage. From his Jakarta prison he was able to 
maintain his contacts with the independence struggle outside (aided by a mobile phone 
secreted into the jail). Select key supporters were given intensive training in the use of 
computer-mediated communications technologies overseas from a computer expert 
who had been involved in setting up the "minihub.org" network for the use of civil 
society organizations. With such skills, Gusmao's supporters in Jakarta could then 
send e-mail messages using "PGP" ("Pretty Good Privacy") encryption36 to East 
Timorese contacts abroad, such as Ramos-Horta. Until local ISPs (Internet Service 
Providers) were established in Indonesia, these activists logged on to the internet by 
dialing internationally, usually to Pactok, a low-cost electronic mail network for NGO 
movements in the Asia-Pacific region set up in 1991. Internet correspondence, which 
could be handily encrypted, offered users greater peace of mind than telephone
32 Amy Goodman and Allan Naim escaped to Guam the day of the massacre and carried out phone and 
other kinds of interviews with world media from there.
33 On apakabar, see Sen and Hill, Media, Culture and Politics in Indonesia, pp. 200-202.
34 Michael Maher, Indonesia: An Eyewitness Account (Ringwood: Viking, 2000), pp. 209-210.
35 For details of the trial, see International Commission of Jurists, Report on the Trial of Xanana Gusmao in 
Dili, East Timor (Geneva: ICJ, 1993).
36 "Pretty Good Privacy" encryption, released publicly on the internet in 1991, enables users to share 
common "keys," some public and some private, which can be used in transmitting and decoding "scrambled" 
confidential e-mail messages. PGP is so powerful that it is virtually impossible to break the code of PGP- 
encrypted e-mails without the personal "key." See Moschovitis et al., History of the Internet, pp. 158-159; 
Kennedy, The Rough Guide to the Internet, p. 121; and http://www.pgpi.org (accessed January 24,2002).
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conversations that could easily be tapped. The ability to transmit large amounts of 
information instantaneously had the added advantage of cost efficiency.37
Internationally, internet usage was increasing amongst the broader public as the 
technology became more "user-friendly." The public release in August 1993 of a "click- 
and-point graphics browser" (that is, one which required a single "click" rather than a 
string of arcane computer text instruction to activate commands) dramatically 
simplified internet entry and use, and consumer interest grew accordingly.38 By 1994, a 
single online service provider, America Online, for example, had four million members, 
mainly inexperienced, mainstream members of the public. While the vast majority of 
activists using sources like "reg.easttimor" were users of APC or academic networks, 
simplified software and expanding network access enabled even computer novices 
from around the world readily to access a vast array of materials on the Net, including 
information about East Timor.
TimorNet at the University of Coimbra, Portugal, for example, provided links to 
information on the history, geography, and culture of the territory, as well as to key 
UN documents, details of human rights violations, relevant on-line articles and 
publications, ideas and mobilization advice for activists, news archives, and on-line 
discussion groups.39 One of the most enduring mailing lists to emerge was produced by 
ETAN /U S,40 which had been catalyzed by the Santa Cruz massacre and had 
mobilized existing networks and the internet to achieve a nationwide presence, with "a 
dozen local chapters and several thousands members" by 1996.41 ETAN/US provided 
e-mailed action alerts on issues such as "the need to lobby congress, severe human 
rights violations, and the like," with postings averaging about two or three a month. In 
addition, "reg.easttimor" routinely contained postings from the CNRM, ETAN/US, 
and support groups in Australia, Portugal, Canada, Ireland, and elsewhere.42 "Reports 
and translations from various wire services, the Indonesian, Portuguese, Australian, 
British, US and Irish press also regularly appealed] there, along with UN and other 
official documents" totaling about six to ten postings daily.43 The site, "reg.easttimor," 
also provided internet "conference" and "newsreader" facilities, and weekly news 
summaries. Interested parties could be automatically e-mailed daily updates, or they 
could elect to receive a newsletter, Network News, of six to ten pages, five times per 
year, delivered either electronically or in paper. From 1991 to 1995, ETAN/US 
published a "roughly semi-monthly paper publication," Documents on East Timor, of 
selected articles from "reg.easttimor"; this publication was mailed to people who did
371 would like to thank Ms. Kirsty Sword-Gusmao (who, as a member of the underground, smuggled 
information between Xanana Gusmao, Ramos-Horta, and others) for discussing use of the internet by 
activists in these early years. Personal interview, Jakarta, June 12, 2001.
38 Moschovitis et al., History of the Internet, pp. 171-173.
39 See http://www.ci.uc.pt/Timor/netret.htm (accessed August 10,2001).
4  ^Details sourced from http: /  / www.ci.uc.pt/Timor/mlists.htm (accessedAugust 10,2001).
44 Charles Scheiner, "Grassroots in the Field—Observing the East Timor Consultation," in Bitter Flowers, 
Sweet Flowers, pp. 109-124, quotation from p. 110. Scheiner was the national coordinator of ETAN/US 
until August 2001.
42 Renamed east-timor@igc.topica.com, this newsgroup continues to operate with several hundred 
subscribers around the world. Scheiner, personal communication, September 7,2001.
43 Quotation from http:/ / www.ci.uc.pt/Timor/mlists.htm, sighted February 24,2002.
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not have e-mail access. "By 1995, e-mail access was ubiquitous enough that the paper 
publication ceased."44
Internet was enabling pro-East Timor activists from around the world to work 
collectively, "coordinating closely with East Timorese leaders both inside the occupied 
territory and in exile,"45 in a focused, accurate manner only previously achieved by 
governments or large international corporations. For some supporters at least, the very 
newness and capacity of the medium itself, with the startling advances in 
communication it offered, engendered a new confidence in their own capacity to 
organize and mobilize support. The speed, currency, and volume of communication 
that the internet offered gave activists their own "mass medium" which, in turn, 
encouraged greater activist response.46 Once information—even a snippet smuggled by 
an individual out of East Timor—was fed into this electronic network, it became 
further ammunition in the global battle for public opinion. In the commercial media, 
"accounts of the suffering of the Timorese were sporadic, and rarely came into sharp 
and sustained focus." By contrast, electronic networking, made possible by internet 
technology, assisted in maintaining nodes of informed activists and, beyond them, a 
broader "group of sympathisers ready to respond if and when some development re­
ignited the issue."47
By 1994, just as "point-and-click" browsers were stimulating a proliferation of 
organizational and personal "home pages" on the Web, Indonesia itself was being 
wired to the internet. Initially, this took place via university campuses, but from 1995 
commercial ISPs, including the popular wasantara.net established by the national postal 
system, fanned out across the archipelago 48 Activist non-governmental organizations 
were quick to grasp and take advantage of the technology's potential. Established civil 
society institutions like the Legal Aid Institute moved quickly on-line. So too did small 
provincial groups like Yayasan Geni in Salatiga, student-activist fronts like SMID 
(Solidaritas Mahasiswa Indonesia untuk Demokrasi, Indonesian Student Solidarity for 
Democracy), and unauthorized labor unions like PPBI (Pusat Perjuangan Buruh 
Indonesia, Center for Indonesian Workers' Struggle) and the SBSI (Serikat Buruh 
Sejahtera Indonesia, Indonesian Prosperous Workers' Union), all of whom recognized 
the political benefits of networking, using the internet as a virtual "news pool" through 
which they could distribute their materials globally. Among such civil society 
organizations were a growing number taking up the cause of a free East Timor. From 
1991, early supporters included Infight (Indonesian Front for the Defense of Fluman 
Rights), Lembaga Penegakan Hak-hak Asasi Manusia (LPHAM, Institute to Uphold 
Human Rights), and Hidup Baru (the Christian "New Life" organization). By the mid- 
1990s, they were joined by Pijar (Center of Information and Action Network for
44 Personal communication from Charles Scheiner, who published Documents on East Timor (communication 
September 7,2001).
45 Scheiner, "Grassroots in the Field," p. 111.
46 My thanks to John Waddingham for making this point (personal e-mail, September 5,2001).
47 Tiffen, Diplomatic Deceits, p. 42.
46 On the arrival of the internet in Indonesia, see David T. Hill and Krishna Sen, "Wiring the Waning to 
Global Gateways: The Internet in Indonesia," Indonesia 63 (April 1997): 67-89.
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Reform), Yapipham (an inter-religious organization), the Jakarta Social Institute, the 
Joint Committee for the Defense of the East Timorese (JCDET), and others.49
This spreading infrastructure assisted the independence movement, supported by 
members of the East Timorese underground, many of whom were studying in Java and 
Bali. Students studying outside of East Timor had long provided a vital conduit for 
information out of the territory (the Catholic Church and sympathetic "tourists" 
visiting Timor provided other significant channels for disseminating news).50 The 
expansion of internet facilities increased the underground's effectiveness. An East 
Timor internet news network was established. Working with Indonesian supporters, 
learning together to use laptops as mobile internet servers and how to use virtually 
unbreakable encryption software to maintain secrecy, members of the student 
underground maintained daily contact with colleagues within East Timor who were 
feeding out stories of human rights abuses, intimidation and resistance, which then 
immediately entered the international public domain.51 Critical to the ultimate success 
of the movement was a
complex two-way flow of information and decision-making structures reaching 
from Cipinang Prison in Jakarta where Gusmao was confined, to East Timor and 
beyond to CNRT [National Council of Timorese Resistance] external leadership 
and the ever-increasing numbers of impressive activists and intellectuals emerging 
from East Timorese diaspora communities around the world.52
By 1996, the internet—with mailing lists like apakabar and its local alternatives— 
was rapidly replacing paper copy and "snail mail" as the dominant mode of 
communication for at least younger, technophilic activists within this international 
network. Even for many of the older, more established activists, who were coming to 
computers late in life with no technical training, there was a growing realization that 
they should tackle the technology in their human rights work because of the efficiency it 
offered. There was a widespread appreciation of its potency and its practical 
usefulness for political lobbying and campaigning, information transfer and 
dissemination, and public and private communication. Within East Timor, too, the 
speed and anonymity of e-mail communication contrasted with public fax
49 For a discussion of Indonesian support groups, see George J. Aditjondro, Menyongsong Matahari Terbit 
di Puncak Ramelau: Dampak Pendudukan Timor Lorosa'e dan Munculnya Gerakan Pro-Timor Lorosa'e di 
Indonesia (Jakarta: Yayasan HAK & Fortilos, 2000), pp. 249-260. An earlier English version can be found 
at http://www.asiet.org.au/reports/gja_petl.htm (accessed September 3,2001).
50 From the early 1980s, underground Timorese student organizations in Java and Bali (like RENET1L) 
found they had easier access to resources and greater freedom for political discussion and action than their 
counterparts inside East Timor, who were subject to far greater surveillance and scrutiny. See Constancio 
Pinto, "The Student Movement and the Independence Struggle in East Timor: An Interview," in Bitter 
Flowers, Sweet Flowers, pp. 31-41, particularly pp. 33 and 38.
51 Andreas Harsono, "Journalists' use of the Internet bubbled up from underground," Nieman Reports 54,4 
(Winter 2000): 74-76, located via http://global.umi.com/pqdweb/ (accessed March 8,2001). Harsono 
provides a valuable insider's view of the use of the internet by Indonesian journalists both before and after 
the fall of Suharto. I would like to thank Charles Scheiner, former National Coordinator, East Timor 
Action Network/US, for background information on this aspect (personal e-mail communication, March 
27, 2001).
52 Richard Tanter, Mark Selden, and Stephen R. Shalom, "East Timor Faces the Future," in Bitter Flowers, 
Sweet Flowers, p. 246.
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correspondence—which was comparatively exposed and vulnerable to surveillance— 
particularly for getting information out of the territory. Such public-access 
communication was risky, and many young East Timorese activists were arrested and 
jailed for faxing or phoning out information.53 Even in 1997, the quasi-government 
Telkom office, frequented by the Indonesian military and paramilitary, remained the 
only public place in Dili from which to send an international fax.54 During these latter 
years of struggle, so pervasive were the new communications technologies that, 
according to Ramos-Horta, information on the internal situation in East Timor came 
directly from guerrillas, "written on laptops in the mountains."55 In July 1999, for 
example, the military cantonment of Falintil commander Taur Matan Ruak was 
equipped with satellite phones—by then, ubiquitous—and at least two laptop 
computers.56 But in the campaign for East Timor's independence, the internet was not 
simply a mechanism for distributing information and exchanging military intelligence. It 
was a virtual "territory" and battlespace in its own right. It is to this tactical use of the 
internet as a site for a new form of conflict, or "cyberwar," that we now turn our 
attention.
"Independence in Cyberspace"
Twelve months after the Nobel Prize for Peace was awarded to Jose Ramos-Horta 
and Bishop Carlos Felipe Ximenes Belo, on the opposite side of the globe to East 
Timor, The Irish Times reported on November 17,1997 that:
East Timor might not exist as [a] country due to the Indonesian invasion, but 
next month it will achieve independence in cyberspace, thanks to an Irish Internet 
service provider. East Timor's own top-level domain (".tp") has been taken up and 
registered, and Connect Ireland will administer it in conjunction with East Timorese 
people currently living here. They intend to hand over the domain to East Timor on 
independence.
"We are reserving all appropriate names for the future [East Timor] 
government such as government, subdomain government and all related activities 
such as education, health etc" a spokesman [sic] for the East Timor Ireland 
Solidarity Campaign says. The domain's official launch date has been set for 
December 7th, the invasion's anniversary.57
531 would like to thank Charles Schemer for pointing this out, and suggesting Jose Antonio Belo as a well- 
known case in point.
54 Martinkus, A Dirty Little War, p. 43. The author describes the intimidating atmosphere in the Telkom 
office during his visit in 1997.
55 J. Ramos-Horta, "Site seeing," Guardian, January 11,1999, p. 12, cited in Chris Mann and Fiona Stewart, 
Internet Communication and Qualitative Research: A Handbook for Researching Online (London: Sage 
Publications, 2000), p. 18.
56 Martinkus, A Dirty Little War, p. 247. Taur Matan Ruak had become commander after the death of Konis 
Santana.
57 "A digital domain for East Timor," The Irish Times on the Web, November 17,1997, at h ttp :// scripts.ire- 
land.com/search/higlig. . .=/newspaper/computimes/1997/1117/ cmp4.htm (accessed March 9,2001).
East Timor and the Internet 37
In a linked document defining "the social and political aspiration for the East 
Timor domain," Connect Ireland Project Director Martin Maguire noted that the 
domain rules "acknowledge our obligations to the people o f East Timor, the Diaspora from 
this country and their continued call for freedom" (italics in the original). Furthermore,
The domain registry and applicants for services under this domain (.tp) hereby 
affirm East Timor's inalienable, indefeasible, and sovereign right to choose its 
own form of Government, to determine its relations with other nations, and to 
develop its life, political, economic and cultural, in accordance with its own 
genius and traditions.
The domain-name "hostmaster team at Connect-Ireland" was responsible for the 
domain, which members of the team established "following well established and 
developed policies and procedures based on Internet standards, on discussions with 
service providers and network experts both within and outside East Timor, and on 
experience."58 What the document did not mention at the time was that the 
application for the registration of the domain, smuggled into Cipinang prison for 
approval, designated Xanana Gusmao as the official contact for the domain.59 The 
rules of the Internet Assigned Number Authority (IANA) require, as the technical 
administrator, someone with an address and telephone line in East Timor, so the 
application listed the phone number of the barracks of the Indonesian Military 
Commander in Dili where Gusmao spent his last night in East Timor!60
By 1997, the internet had become such a common venue for the communication of 
ideas and information between East Timor activists that the claim for an East Timor 
domain name was a logical assertion of the nation's "virtual" rights, rights vehemently 
contested by the Indonesian authorities. The Indonesian embassy in London responded 
that, while Indonesia fully respected the freedom of cyberspace, it was
concerned that this freedom has been misused by Connect Ireland to spread a 
campaign against Indonesia. The handover of the domain to the government of 
East Timor is beyond imagination since the government of East Timor will not 
exist.61
58 The East Timor Top Level Internet Domain (.tp), located at http:/ / www.nic.tp/etrules.htm (accessed 
March 9, 2001).
59 Simon Hayes, "Push to give Timor control over domain," The Australian, February 13,2001, p. 42. The e- 
mail address for the administrator was apparently xanana@minihub.org (conversation with Kirsty Sword- 
Gusmao, Jakarta, June 12,2001).
60 William Hederman, "Internet recognition for East Timor," The Irish Times, December 6,1997, located on 
http://www.freedom.tp/struggle.htm (accessed September 7,1999). The registration of the domain name 
may have been important symbolically, but it had attracted only one host by January 1999. See Moschovitis 
et al., History of the Internet, p. 280, which provides a table of 'Top-Level Domain names by Host Country." 
East Timor's low host numbers for ".tp" contrast starkly with the commercially attractive domain name for 
the largely unknown South Pacific island state of Niue, with 1,608 hosts. This popularity was primarily 
due to Niue's memorable domain tag, ".nu," which means "now" in Norwegian, Danish, Swedish, and 
Dutch. For details, see "A digital domain for East Timor," The Irish Times on the Web, November 17,1997, 
at http://scripts.ireland.com/search/higlig.. .= /newspaper/computimes/1997/1117/cmp4.htm,
(accessed March 9, 2001).
61 Hederman, "Internet recognition for East Timor."
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The internet strategies of the pro-independence movement were beginning to bite. 
Adverse internet publicity was alarming the Indonesian military. East Timor 
commander, Colonel Slamet Sidabutar, used the occasion of a visit by the US military 
attache on August 13, 1997 to stress to the news media that security in East Timor 
was not as oppressive as depicted in internet news.62 Internet coverage of East Timor 
was also worrying members of Indonesia's Parliament (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat, 
DPR), some of whom urged the government to open up the territory to European mass 
media "so they do not need to take information about East Timor from the Non- 
Governmental Organizations which often have a negative perception of Indonesia." B. 
N. Marbun, a member of the DPR and of the National Commission on Human Rights 
(Komnas HAM), advocated opening the territory because "We have to counter the 
negative influence of East Timor news in Internet."63 The Indonesian government was 
recognizing the adverse potential of the internet as a source of information and was 
casting around for strategies to counter it. In the hands of civil society activists, the 
internet offered more than just a rapid method of distributing information. Maximizing 
the Net's political impact was becoming an activist art in itself, with considerable 
potential for escalation.
Hacktivism as Political Strategy
Dorothy Denning, in a paper examining the internet as a tool for influencing 
American foreign policy, identified three broad classes of internet-related activism:
The first category, activism, refers to normal, non-disruptive use of the Internet in 
support of an agenda or cause. [This] includes browsing the Web for information, 
constructing Web sites and posting materials on them, transmitting electronic 
publications and letters through e-mail, and using the Net to discuss issues, form 
coalitions, and plan and coordinate activities. The second category, hacktivism, 
refers to the marriage of hacking and activism. It covers operations that use 
hacking techniques against a target's Internet site with the intent of disrupting 
normal operations but not causing serious damage. Examples are Web sit-ins and 
virtual blockades, automated e-mail bombs, Web hacks, computer break-ins, and 
computer viruses and worms.64 The final category, cyberterrorism, refers to the 
convergence of cyberspace and terrorism. It covers politically motivated hacking 
operations intended to cause grave harm such as loss of life or severe economic
62 "Internet undermines E Timor Security Situation," Antara, August 15,1997, located via a search of 
http://global.umi.com (accessed March 8,2001).
63 "MP suggests opening up E Timor to European Mass Media," Antara, September 10,1997, located via a 
search of http:/ /global.umi.com (accessed March 8,2001).
64 A "virus" is a "code designed to infect computers and replicate itself by using other programs or data, 
either for no meaningful reason (a prank) or with malicious intent," while a "worm" is a self-replicating 
program which can spread from computer to computer within a network without requiring users to activate 
it. Moschovitis et al., History of the Internet, pp. 136 and 294.
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damage. An example would be penetrating an air traffic control system and 
causing two planes to collide.65
Since 1997, East Timor activism on the Net had included actions which fit into 
Denning's second category, with cyber-attacks becoming increasingly common. 
Information (including dis-information) placed on a website by either party in an 
international conflict was open to hacking and manipulation. In 1997, hackers66 
breached several official Indonesian government websites, posting pro-independence 
messages and linking them to pro-independence websites. By May 1997, (as reported 
by the South China Morning Post) the Indonesian government was "waging war against 
a new breed of freedom fighter for East Timor—the computer hacker."67 With the net- 
name "Toxyn," a hacker from the group "Portuguese Hackers Against Indonesia" 
breached the military's website and scrawled "propaganda" across it. Breaches had 
already occurred to the sites of the Department of Foreign Affairs, the IPTEK 
government computer system, the Indonesian Institute of Studies, and the Surabaya 
Institute of Technology, according to Indonesian computer guru Onno W. Purba of the 
Bandung Institute of Technology's Computer Network Research Group. The 
penetration of the military site was quickly rectified, but hacktivism had become a 
proven strategy in the East Timor struggle. So substantial and so frequent were the 
anti-Indonesian government hacks of 1997 that the campaign (along with breaches of 
NASA, the British Conservative Party, and the Spice Girls websites) was declared one 
of the "Hacks of the Year" in an international survey of the past quarter-century's 
computer milestones.68
On July 11, 1998, Portuguese hackers known as "kaotik" penetrated the 
Department of Security site, replacing it with the slogan "Free Xanana Gusmao." They 
declared,
This attack is not against Indonesian [sic] people but against its government and 
their opression [sic] towards the republic of Timor. These actions were made to
65 Dorothy E. Denning, "Activism, Hacktivism, and Cyberterrorism: The Internet as a Tool for Influencing 
Foreign Policy" (Washington, DC: Georgetown University, 2000), h ttp ://www.nautilus.org/info- 
policy/workshop/papers/denning.html (accessed March 15,2001).
66 The term "hacker" was originally coined in the early 1960s by computer programmers at the 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology to refer to programmers who were passionately dedicated to the 
belief that "information-sharing is a powerful positive good," and who shared their computer expertise "by 
writing free software and facilitating access to information and to computing resources wherever 
possible"; the connotation of the word was meant to be positive. In the mid-1980s, the media popularized 
the term as a pejorative for computer criminals such as virus writers. This led hackers to coin the 
uncomplimentary term "cracker" to differentiate those imbued with the "hacker ethic" from "criminal 
hackers." See Pekka Himanen, The Hacker Ethic and the Spirit of the Information Age (London: Seeker & 
Warburg, 2001), esp. pp. vi-vii, which cites The Jargon File at www.tuxedo.org/~esr/jargon. This paper 
uses "hacker" in its original sense.
67 Jenny Grant, "Guerilla Hackers take on Military," South China Morning Post, May 3,1997, at 
http://www.infowar.com/hacker/hackza.html-ssi (accessed March 15, 2001).
68 "Looking Back...," Computing Canada, June 12,2000, p. 6, sourced through
http://web2.infotrac.galegroup.com (accessed March 9,2001). The Indonesian Government sites were 
apparently hit repeatedly on January 19, February 10, April 24, June 30, and November 22,1997, while the 
other sites were only attacked once: NASA (March 5), UK Conservative Party (April 27), and Spice Girls 
(November 14).
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honour and remember all the 250 people killed in Dili on thel2November [sic] 
1991. WE DONT [sic] FORGET WHAT THEY HAVE DONE !!!!!69
Over the first two days of August this same group hacked forty-five Indonesian 
domains, in what appears to be one of the largest single co-ordinated hack-attacks 
ever.70 In a media interview, one member of the group in his early twenties, known only 
by the hacker name "Secretos," outlined the group's political agenda: "We have 
hundreds of servers we could hack, and we don't. [ . . . ] The main objective of our 
hacking pages is to transmit the message [of East Timor independence]. It is not, 'We 
are groovy, we have power.'"71 For "kaotik," cyber-attack was part of a broader 
political strategy.
The Toxyn attack triggered a revenge strike by a group dubbed the "Indonesian 
Street Fighters" who claimed to have crashed Toxyn's server (although Toxyn denied 
this, countering that they were simply "down" while upgrading). What appears to be 
another group, "IndoHack," reportedly attempted to attack the Portuguese server, but 
was unsuccessful. In another counter attack, "ByteSkrew" succeeded in penetrating the 
server of Portugal's University of Coimbra, which hosted TimorNet Information 
Service.72 The attacks were part of a growing hacking culture developing in Indonesia, 
in which the practitioners dubbed themselves "electronic cockroaches" (kecoak 
elektronik). But some of the young Indonesian hactivists who were initially hostile, 
above all towards Portugal, gradually changed this position. According to one report 
on the kecoak elektronik homepage, exchanges of abuse between Toxyn and ByteSkrew 
softened into an "alliance" between them as the Portuguese explained their political 
perspective. The article by a self-confessed hacker concluded that the majority of 
Indonesian young generation hackers "are anti-establishment and anti-oppression. 
And a tyrannical government like Indonesia is justifiably seen as the enemy by them."73 
Portuguese hackers' criticism of Suharto's folly in East Timor seemed to elicit 
sympathy from Indonesian hackers caught up in the growing mood of domestic 
opposition to the President in late 1997 and 1998.
However, despite the Reformasi movement in Indonesia, which forced Suharto to 
step down on May 21, 1998, internet attacks against pro-East Timor sites continued, 
with some highly coordinated and, in the opinion of opponents, officially sanctioned. 
When "cyberspace saboteurs" forced the ISP Connect Ireland off line in January 1999, 
the company, which had been acting as a server for sites using the East Timor domain 
name, suspected that this campaign had official Indonesian backing. It protested to the 
Indonesian Embassy in London. Connect Ireland Project Director, Martin Maguire, 
stated that their servers had come under systematic attack from at least ten different
69 The hacked page can be viewed at http://www.kaotik.org/98/hankaml.html (accessed March 15, 
2001).
70 Details of the forty-five servers hacked are given on h ttp ://www.kaotik.org/98 (accessed March 15, 
2001).
71 Quoted in Amy Harmon, "Hacktivists of All Persuasions Take their Struggle to the Web," 
http://w ww .kaotik.org/98/n 5rtimesl.html (accessed March 15,2001).
72 http://www.uc.pt/scripts/timomet/sirius.exe/etmp7index.html (accessed January 24,2002).
73 Chiko Torremendez/'Situasi perhackingan indonesia[sic]," located at http://w ww .k- 
elektronik.org/ezine/situasi.htm (accessed March 27,2001).
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sources in a strategy he believed was organized by the Indonesian government. The 
attacks, over more titan nine months, were not directed at a single website, but at the 
top level domain for East Timor, ".tp." In what was described by one Irish newspaper 
as "the most sophisticated [cyber-attack] ever recorded in this country," eighteen 
separate hackers apparently operated in unison throughout the night of January 19 to 
break into Connect Ireland's security system. Maguire believed "the attack was so well 
organised, so deliberate and so skilful that whoever was doing it must be getting paid. 
The value to them is not one of kudos."74 Indonesian authorities denied any 
involvement in the incident, but Maguire persisted in his suspicions, claiming "It's a 
regime that has shown little regard for human life. Attacking an Internet service would 
not be outside their moral boundaries."75 After the attack, Maguire declared "we 
received support from many Indonesians—who translated our statement(s) [sic] into 
the many languages that are used within that territory and circulated these widely."76 
The incident attracted extensive international attention in the mainstream print and 
electronic media, and Maguire was inundated with "some 14,000+ email offering 
support."77 If the attack on Connect Ireland had been officially sanctioned, the 
President of Indonesia was clearly not aware of it, for Habibie had already informed 
his Ministers on New Year's Day that he would accept independence for East Timor if 
that was the outcome of a "popular consultation." This dramatic shift was announced 
publicly by Foreign Minister Ali Alatas and Information Minister Yunus Yosfiah on 
January 27, eight days after Connect Ireland temporarily shut down.78
On April 21-23, 1999, the Indonesian proposal was formally presented at talks 
with Portugal and the UN Secretary-General, to be formally signed off on May 5 with a 
"popular consultation" agreed for August.79 An Australian Parliamentary inquiry 
noted that in East Timor "human rights abuses decreased [after Suharto's resignation] 
and security forces did not interfere with public rallies and demonstrations in major 
towns." The presidential transfer had inspired a greater boldness amongst the pro­
independence students and the underground resistance, but, as the inquiry added, 
"this more tolerant approach did not last long and serious abuses became more 
frequent from late 1998."80 The prospect of a referendum injected a new uncertainty. 
While, for its part, Falintil observed a unilateral ceasefire, militias—transparently 
created, funded, armed, and directed by the Indonesian military—attempted to
74 Maguire is quoted by Caroline O'Doherty, The Examiner Front Page, January 23,1999, located on the 
East Timor Ireland Solidarity Campaign site. (This article was provided to me by John Waddingham.)
75 Information on the Connect Ireland attack is given in "Hackers rob East Timor of cyberspace 
independence," at http://asia.internet.com/Reuters/1999/01/2801-news.html, and Brian McWilliams, 
"Irish Provider Blames Failure on Other ISPs" on http ://www.intemetnews.com/isp- 
news/print/0,1089,8_63651,00.html, (both accessed September 5,1999), and "Press Release from Connect- 
Ireland Communications Ltd" at http:/ / www.freedom.tp/press.htm (accessed September 7,1999). Maguire 
is quoted in McWilliams.
76 Martin Maguire in "Press Release—from Connect-Ireland Communications Ltd."
77 Information from Martin Maguire, e-mail communication, March 13,2001.
78 See Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia, East Timor: Final Report, p. 178.
79 The initial date of the "popular consultation" was to be August 8,1999, but it was postponed to August 
30.
8® Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia, East Timor: Final Report, p. 89.
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terrorize the UN into abandoning East Timor and to intimidate the population so that 
citizens would be afraid to cast pro-independence votes in the referendum.81
Amidst this heightening terror, even as the United Nations Mission in East Timor 
(UNAMET) prepared for the ballot, the internet battle for East Timor took a new turn. 
On August 17 Ramos-Horta reportedly threatened to unleash a "desperate and 
ferocious" internet campaign if Indonesia refused to honor the results of the August 30 
referendum. He claimed more than one hundred computer hacktivists had prepared a 
dozen special computer viruses capable of bringing Indonesia to a standstill for weeks 
by infecting electronic communications systems, including aviation. It was an assertion 
doubted by many, including some close to Ramos-Horta. But, in Denning's terms, this 
was a threat to escalate from hactivism to cyber-terrorism. It was reported that 
Ramos-Horta claimed that hackers, mostly teenagers in Europe and the USA, stood 
ready to attack Indonesia's banks, stock exchange, and government computer 
systems.82 Indonesian officials declared they would take "preventative action" against 
Ramos-Horta's threats, which they viewed as "extremely serious" and which were 
referred to the Ministry for Political and Security Affairs. Dino Patti Djalal, a senior 
official in the Indonesian Foreign Ministry, was quoted declaring, "This is terrorism 
against democracy."83
Martin Maguire, victim of the Connect Ireland hack, quickly disassociated his 
organization from Ramos-Horta's tactic, declaring that
we do not condone attacks of any kind on the Internet or other similar 
technologies. We believe in the freedom of speech and in everyone's ability to 
conduct their communication for their own legitimate purposes. We [ . . .  ] believe 
there is more to be gained by maintaining the opportunities that can be developed 
through free speech than in conducting cyberwarfare.84
But the sense that "Indonesia may be on the brink of a cyberwar" was growing within 
some sections of the country's political elite, as the leading English-language Jakarta 
Post editorialized that
the employment of the Internet for political expression and conflict is an 
inevitable consequence of the information revolution^ . . . ] It is indicative of
81 There were, for example, fifty-seven people killed in Liquisa on April 6 with a dozen more murdered in 
Dili on April 17. See Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia, East Timor: Final Report, p. 179. See 
also Martinkus, A Dirty Little War, pp. 116-262, where the author describes this period graphically.
82 Lindsay Murdoch, "Computer chaos threat to Jakarta," Sydney Morning Herald, August 18,1999, p. 9. 
This source was used by David Legard, "Cyberwar threatens Indonesia," The Standard, dated August 19, 
1999, located at http://www.thestandard.com/article/article_print/0,1153,5962,00.html (accessed 
March 29, 2001).
88 Lindsay Murdoch, "Fury over computer threat," Sydney Morning Herald, August 20,1999, p. 8. This 
source was used by Nancy Weil, "Indonesia Answers Hacker Threats," The Standard, August 19,1999, 
located at http: / / www.thestandard.com/article/display/0,1151,5978,00.html (accessed March 29,
2001).
84 "Press Release—from Connect-Ireland Communications Ltd." (August 19,1999) located at 
http://www.freedom.tp/press.htm (accessed September 7,1999).
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cyberspace that a territory the size of East Timor is at the center of what has 
become a global issue, and has attracted participants worldwide.85
There is nothing to indicate that Ramos-Horta ever acted on his threat, even during 
what he dubbed "the darkest days of my life" during the post-referendum violence.86 
Irrespective of whether he was able technologically to unleash the attack, to do so may 
well have been judged diplomatically counterproductive. Of her three categories of 
internet activism, Denning had noted, "There is a general progression toward greater 
damage and disruption from the first to the third category, although that does not 
imply an increase of political effectiveness."87 It may be that, just as Gusmao stayed 
Falintil's hand—limiting its activities to certain designated cantonments rather than 
risk civil war and withdrawal of international support for the referendum in the face of 
murderous militia provocation—so too, in the final instance, Ramos-Horta judged a 
cyber-attack on Indonesia would only weaken his nation's moral claim that the 
situation in East Timor merited international military intervention.
Nonetheless, as the diplomatic temperature increased in the weeks prior to the 
referendum, cyber-terrorism—at least at the level of threat—had become another 
strategy in the East Timor conflict. That referendum and its traumatic aftermath 
highlighted the pivotal role new communication technologies were playing in media 
reporting and international responses to the crisis.
Referendum and New Technologies
With large numbers of observers and journalists arriving in the weeks before the 
referendum, getting information out of East Timor by internet, or any other means, took 
patience and determination. The single ISP in East Timor was the national postal 
service's wasantara.net, operating only in Dili.88 When the world's largest organization 
of journalists, the Brussels-based International Federation of Journalists, and two of its 
key Asian affiliates, the Alliance of Independent Journalists in Indonesia and the 
Media, Entertainment, and Arts Alliance in Australia, opened a Safety Office for 
Media in East Timor (SOMET), its e-mail address was somet@dili.wasantara.net.id.89 
Despite the general reliance on an over-stretched wasantara.net, the internet had 
become an integral part of a converging, if still rudimentary, local media. For example, 
prior to the referendum, Fretilin's radio station Radio Vos de Esperance took much of its
85 "East Timor Cyberwar On New Global Battlefield: The Internet," The Jakarta Post, August 30,1999, 
located at http://www.infowar.com/mil_c4i/99/mil_c4I_083099b_j.shtml (accessed March 13, 2001).
86 The intense strain between the September 4 declaration of poll results and the September 13 acceptance 
by President Habibie of a UN peacekeeping force, as Ramos-Horta lobbied relentlessly for international 
intervention, is documented in Tom Zubrycki's film, The Diplomat (produced by Sally Browning for Film 
Australia, Lindfield, 2000). The Ramos-Horta quotation is from Tony Parkinson, "Ramos-Horta: The inside 
story," The Age, August 28, 2000, located at http://etan.org/et2000c/august/27-31/28ram os.htm  
(accessed August 28,2001).
87 Denning, "Activism, Hacktivism, and Cyberterrorism."
88 See [Indonesia-1] "KIPER—Sulitnya Telekomunikasi di Timor Timur," located on
h ttp ://www.indopubs.com/archives/0627.html, dated August 30,1999, but accessed September 3,1999.
89 "IFJ launches safety office for journalists in ET," dated August 7,1999, located at 
http://etan.org/et99b/august/l-7/5ifj.htm  (accessed March 10,2001).
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news from internet sources, which it then translated into the local Tetun language for 
broadcast. The broadcaster's reliance on the internet continued until the station was 
forced to close and its operators to flee into the bush.90
Existing telecommunications infrastructure remained basic, with phone land lines 
scarce and inadequate. Most ordinary citizens had to rely on rare and poorly equipped 
public access telephone kiosks (wartel), of which districts such as Baucau only had 
three—one run by the quasi-government Telkom and two private kiosks. Mobile cell 
phones had become increasingly popular in the preceding years. For interested parties 
ranging from key student activists to militia leaders, the "handphone" had become a 
reasonably common accessory, at least in Dili and in the one or two other major 
centers in which they functioned. However, the two Indonesian mobile phone 
companies, Telkomsel and Satelindo, were unable to cope with the booming demand 
from consumers, a situation that led to a complete log-jam on occasions when demand 
exceeded network capacity. Key players such as Falintil continued to rely on satellite 
phones, for example, to report atrocities to the International Committee of the Red 
Cross.91
Many of the outsiders who flooded the territory to facilitate and observe the 
referendum brought their own mobile communication equipment. Members of the 
international media, and even individual election monitors or observers, were able to 
maintain voice or internet contact with their organizations, via satellite or mobile 
phones, albeit with somewhat frustrating coverage. After a visit to Gleno, about thirty 
kilometers south-west from Dili, the head of the Australian Observer Delegation, Tim 
Fischer, observed "Local communications were next to zero even though telephone or 
mobilenet links existed, although mainly for the area around Dili."92 International 
monitoring teams in the field, like IFET (International Federation for East Timor), for 
example, depended on satellite phones (though land lines were available in Dili where 
the IFET office had six). It was through such links that organizations like IFET 
accessed the internet (via Indonesian servers) and communicated with the outside 
world. News of militia atrocities was rapidly transmitted around the world via 
satellite video link, often from the roof of Dili's Mahkota Hotel, which functioned as a 
virtual studio for the international media who "had brought in container loads of 
equipment for their satellite links back to their home newsrooms."93
Attacks on the general population continued to escalate, with a significant pause 
on the referendum day itself. By September 1, 1999, some Dili residents were seeking 
the relative security of the UNAMET compound. On September 4, the retaliatory 
offensive against the independence movement went into high gear, with buildings
90 Solahudin et al., Ganasnya Satgas, Kejamnya Milisi Timtim: Laporan Kekerasan terhadap Jumalis dan 
Media Massa Mei 1999-April 2000 [The Ferociousness of Satgas, The Cruelty of East Timor Militia—A 
Report on Violence towards Journalists and Mass Media May 1999-April 2000] (Jakarta: AJI Indonesia, 
2000), pp. 14-15.
91 See, e.g., Martinkus, A Dirty Little War, p. 106.
92 Tim Fischer, Seven Days in East Timor: Ballot and Bullets (Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 2000), p. 46.
93 Ibid., p. 36. Fischer provides several examples of how communication by mobile phone enabled the media 
(and the Australian government) to get direct reports from East Timor during the Popular Consultation. See 
ibid., pp. 69,76,94.
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burned in large numbers throughout the territory. By mid September, 300,000 refugees 
were in hiding within East Timor, and another 150,000—this number eventually 
swelled to 250,000—were herded across the border into West Timor.94 The world 
watched the security of East Timor unravel before its eyes. In the days after the 
referendum, international radio and television stations were conducting "live to air" 
phone and video-link interviews with personnel, even those held virtual hostage in the 
surrounded UNAMET compound. Journalist John Martinkus wrote of the UNAMET 
compound at the close of the first week of September
the regular phone lines were cut off, and mobile phones started working only 
occasionally and only on a certain network. Satellite phones had become the only 
real means of communication with the outside world . . . [We] found out later 
that the whole UN contingent had been relying on three satellite phones for 
communication with the outside world.95
For the independent Indonesian media covering the referendum and its aftermath, 
the challenges were equally overpowering.96 When the Indonesian government declared 
a state of martial law in East Timor on September 7, 1999, as the military-backed 
militia razed the territory and virtually depopulated Dili, Indonesia's largest daily 
newspaper, Kompas, took the unusual step of informing readers that, under the 
relevant 1959 legislation (UU Nomor 23/Prp/1959 tentang Keadaan Bahaya) the
. . .  military emergency authorities, among other things, have the right to control 
all postal infrastructure and telecommunications equipment, such as telephones, 
telegraph, radio transmitters, and other equipment which is related to radio 
broadcasting and which can be used to reach the general population.97
As Kompas warned its readers, "the military emergency authorities have the right to 
'censor' the news which will be filed by journalists who are currently still in East 
Timor," for all printed material was similarly subject to military control. Many 
Indonesian media staff were effectively intimidated during this period. But despite 
such regulation, the internet, combined with the vastly more accessible medium of 
broadcast radio, continued to be employed by some Indonesian media organizations to 
disseminate non-government information about East Timor within Indonesia. After the
94 Initial figures are estimates provided by the UN's humanitarian coordinator for East Timor, Ross 
Mountain, on September 19,1999. Cited in John G. Taylor, East Timor: The Price of Freedom (London: Zed 
Books & Annandale: Pluto Press Australia, 1999), p. 229. Taylor provides a detailed chronology of the 
main events in East Timor since 1974 on pp. 200-230. The figure of 250,000 comes from a later Amnesty 
International document, "Annual Report 2000: Indonesia and East Timor," at
http: /  /  www .web .amnesty .org /  web /  ar2000web .nsf /  countries /  a8b2dcbe3c6cac35802568f200552930? 
OpenDocument (accessed September 24,2001).
95 Martinkus, A Dirty Little War, pp. 321, 324.
96 Indonesian journalists were routinely harassed and assaulted. A reporter with Indonesia's largest daily 
newspaper, Kompas, only survived being shot by five bullets on August 26 because of his bullet-proof 
jacket. A month later, his compatriot, Agus Mulyawan (working for the Japanese agency, Asia Press 
International), was murdered at close range after identifying himself as an Indonesian journalist at a militia 
ambush on the Los Palos-Leuteum road. A survey of atrocities against journalists—East Timorese, 
Indonesian and others—is given in the bi-lingual publication Solahudin et al., Ganasnya Satgas, Kejamnya 
Milisi Timtim, particularly pp. 13-28.
97 See [Indonesia-1] "KMP—Di Timtim telepon pun akan dikuasai militer," datelined September 8,1999, 
and quoted here from http://www.indopubs.com/archives/0796.html (accessed September 8,1999).
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militias drove most journalists from the territory and after arrival of the International 
Force for East Timor (InterFET) on September 20, Jakarta-based independent Radio 
68H continued to receive reports from freelancers in East Timor. These reports, 
transmitted from the field via internet or mobile phone, were repackaged and 
distributed by the Radio 68H to 150 stations in its network across Indonesia, using 
both internet and radio transmission.98 Suspicions that anti-independence hackers 
were active resurfaced in Jakarta on the day the UN evacuated all but eighty-four of its 
staff from its compound, leaving Dili (in the words of a departing Portuguese 
journalist) "a ghost city."99 On the afternoon of Friday, September 10, the Jakarta Post 
website's opinion poll mysteriously crashed. The poll, which asked whether Indonesia 
should invite an international force into East Timor, had registered 3,720 votes before 
crashing, with a staggering 94 percent in favor of an international deployment. Faced 
with the inexplicable site crash, the Editor could only announce "our IT people are still 
trying to find out the cause. [ . . .  ] We regret the inconvenience."100
While all forms of media coverage of the referendum and subsequent pillage of East 
Timor contributed to the considerable weight of international public opinion, the well- 
established activist internet networks provided a powerful infrastructure for the 
dissemination of up-to-the-minute information on unfolding events. As one observer 
noted:
East Timor was the first country bom of the Internet Age, thanks to the 
sophisticated information bombardment of its committed supporters. [. . . ] Part 
of the reason for the turn of events in September 1999 when President Clinton 
and Prime Minister Howard relented to armed peacekeepers going to East Timor 
was the level of Internet outrage on embassy systems at the White House, in 
Portugal, and the Australian Parliament."101
It was a view endorsed by Ramos-Horta, who declared the ultimate acceptance by 
President Habibie of an international force "illustrates the power of the media, the 
power of images, the power of the Internet."102 He believed "it was the weight of world 
public opinion—and shame—that finally liberated East Timor."103 In turning this 
shame into a political victory, and in mobilizing international political and military 
support, the internet has proved a sophisticated tool. It is also proved to be a vital 
means of communication during the period of reconstruction.
98 For details on Radio 68H, see www.radio68h.or.id, and Jeanne Carstensen "Internet Radio," Whole 
Earth (Spring 2000): 89, located via http://web2.infotrac.galegroup.com/itw (accessed March 9,2001).
99 Quoted in Taylor, East Timor, pp. 228-229.
100 http://www.thejakartapost.com:8890/iscp_render?menu_name=frontpage (accessed September 13, 
1999).
101 Bernadette Connole, "Irony in the Pacific for long-distance diplomat," The Australian, June 26,2000, 
located at http://etan.org/et2000b/june/25-30/26irony.htm , (accessed March 10, 2001).
102 Quoted in Parkinson, "Ramos-Horta: The inside story."
103 Ramos-Horta's position is noted in Mark Chipperfield, "Keeping the issue alive," in East Timor: Making 
Amends? Analysing Australia's Role in Reconstructing East Timor, ed. Lansell Taudevin and Jefferson Lee 
(Sydney: Otford Press, 2000), pp. 145-147, quotation from p. 147.
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Indonesia's scorched-earth policy left the territory without most basic 
infrastructure. In post-referendum East Timor, one of the early logistical requirements 
of both the military peacekeepers and the international non-governmental 
organizations was the establishment of secure, reliable internet and e-mail 
communication. The United States InterFET contingent insured secure internet access 
to their Defense Department's classified network for military information.104 Following 
the experience of the US military, which in 1995 began linking its overseas service 
personnel with their home bases and families via internet in what was dubbed 
"Operation Home Front," InterFET quickly set up an internet cafe for its staff in 
Dili.105 Oxfam International/ Community Aid Abroad quickly linked their Dili field 
office by e-mail to the rest of their international organization abroad.106 Local 
community and religious organizations (like the Carmelites) established their own 
internet connections, initially using superseded computers from aid dispatches 
(described by one journalist as "old stuff that might ordinarily be destined for the 
scrap yard").107 The technological and internet savvy of international supporters 
continued to play a role. The East Timor Institute for Reconstruction Monitoring and 
Analysis, La'o Hamutuk (Walking Together), for example, was set up to "monitor, to 
analyze, and to report on the activities of the principal international institutions 
present in Timor Loro Sa'e [... and] to facilitate greater levels of East Timorese 
participation in the reconstruction and development of the country."108 In producing 
its regular bulletins and e-mail updates, this local initiative was assisted by ETAN/US 
through its homepage at www.etan.org/lh/.
The advantages of internet connectivity for the new state were quickly espoused, 
with Ramos-Horta declaring in February 2000 that his country would turn to the 
internet to generate trade and investment as it integrated with the world.109 Having 
witnessed the power of the internet during the long years of struggle, Ramos-Horta was 
well placed to recognize its potential benefits for an independent East Timor. He 
observed:
104 Bill Murray, "U.S. peacekeepers use Net to access classified network," Government Computer News 
19,11 (May 15, 2000): 40, downloaded via http://web2.infotrac.galegroup.com/itw on March 9, 2001.
105 Moschovitis et al., History of the Internet, p. 206. The author gives details of Operation Home Front. See 
also Alan Ryan, "Primary Responsibilities and Primary Risks”: Australian Defence Force Participation in 
the International Force East Timor, Study Paper No. 304 (Duntroon: Land Warfare Studies Centre, 2000). 
This source includes a photograph of the InterFET internet cafe between pp. 66-67.
106 Charlie Brady and Gordon Rowell, "Email to Dili—you have got to be joking!," at 
http://w w w .caa.org.au/groups/IT/dili, (accessed March 13, 2001).
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108 Quoted from http://w w w .etan.org/lh/, (accessed August 14,2001).
109 "Horta Sees Internet Future for East Timor" (accessed February 20,2000), at h ttp ://www.cnn.com/ 
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In this global economy, you don't have to have really an enormous space and 
population of your own. [ . . .  ] You sit at the computer and you trade anywhere 
around the world. You can buy, you can sell, just at the touch of a keyboard. We 
are part of the global economy [ . . .  and] as a small nation we have to look at the 
world through the Internet, meaning surf the rest of the world for business 
opportunities to sell, to buy, to invest.110
Establishing that connection to the global economy proved challenging. Commercial 
or individual users of the internet (who might not have a laptop and mobile phone 
modem) were soon able to use an Australian Telstra Internet room in Dili, but die hefty 
charge of about five Australian dollars for fifteen minutes was prohibitive for virtually 
all East Timorese.111 Nor was it easy to convert East Timor's earlier claim to 
"independence in cyberspace" into a reality, as negotiations with Connect Ireland for 
the transfer of authority over the ".tp" domain name proved prolonged and, as yet, 
inconclusive.112 The Australian Domain Authority (AuDA) stepped in to offer its 
technical and hosting assistance to help East Timor get ".tp" under its control, though 
the issue remains unresolved.113 East Timor does not yet have its own listing in the 
widely used internet search engine Yahoo.com's "Countries" sub-directory.114 
Meanwhile, the East Timor Transitional Administration (ETTA) website, 
www.gov.east-timor.org, is on an American domain, such as is used by the United 
Nations, with a "mirror site" in Malaysia. Many other websites related to East Timor 
are hosted by the UN, UNDP, the World Bank, and international NGOs.
In this transition to independence, ETTA is actively seeking potential internet 
service providers for East Timor, which currently lacks its own. ETTA's policy is that 
"there should be regulation with a light touch aimed at ensuring the protection of the 
customer (quality of service; privacy), adherence to the principles of fair competition 
and network integrity."115 ETTA is calling for tenders for a "Build Operate and 
Transfer project for the construction and operation of a complete Telecommunications 
system for East Timor," with the successful tenderer promised an exclusive license for
110 Ramos-Horta is quoted in Chris Johnson, "Interview: Horta sees Internet future for E.Timor [sic]," 
February 13, 2000, and located at http://etan.org/et2000a/february/13-19/13interv.htm (accessed 
March 10, 2001).
111 Australia's national Telstra mobile phone network operates in East Timor. On the local irritation at 
Australian "carpet-baggers" there, see Conor O'Clery "Timorese leaders plan nation-building," The Irish 
Times on the web, August 28,2000, located via h ttp ://scripts.ireland.com/search (accessed March 9,
2001).
112 Connect Ireland denied reports from within East Timor that negotiations had stalled, stating it was still 
"working towards moving domain activities to Dili" and indicating that "a location will be identified in 
the coming months." Martin Maquire, personal e-mail, October 30,2001.
113 Simon Hayes, "Push to give Timor control over domain," The Australian, February 13,2001, p. 42.
114 Excellent sites on East Timor include: Timor Today at http:/ / www.easttimor.com (accessed March 10, 
2001) and the East Timor Action Network/United States site at
http://www.etan.org/resource/websites.htm (accessed March 10,2001). The search of yahoo.com, 
<http://dir.yahoo.com/Regional/Countries/> was conducted on March 12,2001.
115 Quotations in the paragraph are from East Timor Transitional Administration, "Criteria for Operation 
as an Internet Service Provider in East Timor," last updated August 6,2001, located at
http://www.gov.east-timor.org/itpt/isp_criteria.php (accessed August 13,2001).
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ten years. Significantly, the provision of internet services is explicitly excluded from 
this exclusive license, and, according to the proposed agreement, after a maximum 
transitional period of three years there will be "hill liberalisation of the ISP market." 
Prospective ISPs are warned that "only a small number of the population has, at 
present, access to computers. Moreover their computer skills are very low. Although 
this is likely to change quite rapidly in the future it is not expected that the 
development will be immediate."116 With East Timor's illiteracy rate of at least 15 
percent (and possibly as high as 50 percent), and an economy and infrastructure in 
tatters, it is likely to be some time before the internet in peacetime plays as important a 
role for the people of East Timor as it has during the struggle for independence.
Conclusion
Timor Loro Sa'e might not yet have established itself as a contender in the 
commercial world of the internet, but the internet as a mechanism for exerting 
international political leverage upon Indonesia has proved its value. As MSNBC 
Washington correspondent Brock Meeks reflected in early 1998:
The slaughter of innocents in East Timor might get forty-five seconds on the 
network news and two minutes more on MSNBC or CNN. And then, as a news 
story, it dies. However, take that same story to the Internet and it not only lives, 
it proliferates, millions of times a day. It refuses to die. It refuses to go unnoticed. 
And when enough people generate enough talk, generate enough letters to enough 
of the right people, things start to happen. This is the power of the Internet.117
It was a power mobilized to unanticipated effect by supporters of an independent 
East Timor. But it was not the technology of the internet that sustained an 
international campaign for East Timor. The technology was simply employed by 
activists who would (and did), in its absence, struggle to gain and wield diplomatic 
and political leverage, using whatever technologies were at their disposal. In this 
articulation with a range of other technologies—"new" and "old"—the internet takes 
its place as a powerful tool in the service of civil society.
We can only speculate on the effect such a tool may have had in triggering 
Indonesia's policy shifts, but in reflecting upon the lessons of her East Timor foreign 
policy debacle, one of Indonesia's most senior former spokespeople mused, "we 
should not underestimate the power of NGOs to influence government policies."118 In 
the complex interplay between military strategies and political leverage, many factors 
contributed to the ultimate success of the movement for self-determination in East 
Timor. Chisako M. Fukuda has noted, among other elements, the importance of the 
guerrilla forces in symbolically maintaining the Timorese fighting spirit and identity, the 
contribution of Indonesia in creating an educated (but ultimately under-utilized and 
frustrated) youth who consequently "gravitated to the forefront of the resistance
116 Ibid.
117 Brock Meeks, "No justice, no peace," Association for Computing Machinery. Communications of the ACM 
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movement," and the decisive leadership of Gusmao in initiating strategic shifts from 
armed guerrilla conflict, to underground resistance and non-violent civil protests.119 
Ultimately, however, Fukuda argues that a "commitment to nonviolence came first and 
foremost in building the self-reliance of the resistance movement,"120 and that this was 
crucial in enabling leverage to be exerted over Indonesia, both internationally and 
domestically, through sympathetic human rights and pro-democracy organizations.
For the first fifteen years, before the internet, such civil society organizations used 
"snail mail," telephone, and fax to sustain their campaign for East Timor's self- 
determination. Internet and e-mail were articulated almost unconsciously into the 
activists' armory, so surreptitiously that some of the most active in the campaign have 
difficulty recalling precisely when they adopted the evolving technologies of what 
Manuel Castells has labeled the "informational mode of production."121 But, equally, 
the technology itself may not have been merely incidental. As one long-time Australian 
activist mused,
. . . the new media were TOOLS (which enhanced the effectiveness of 
activism/resistance) rather than stimulating/causing political work. But was 
there something in the one-off 1990s novelty/new-ness/wonder of the medium 
itself which offered/stimulated, outside immediate resistance and activist circles, 
a broader direct engagement with the Timor story (and which ultimately had a 
political impact)? And even among activists, did not the medium engender a 
confidence-building increased sense of power? I suspect it did.122
In the final years at least, "Access by independent eye-witnesses to instantaneous 
communication media—cell phones, satellite transmissions, Internet-based 
networking—made it possible to generate widespread public awareness and conviction 
in 'realtime': that is, while such awareness could still make a difference."123
Barney Warf and John Grimes have argued that "The Internet obviously does not 
guarantee the emergence of counterhegemonic discourses, but it does facilitate the 
opening of discursive spaces within which they may be formulated and conveyed."124 
The way the internet was mobilized in the cause of East Timor supports this 
conclusion. The Net enables individuals and local groups to draw effectively upon 
skills and resources from supporters located far away. It can focus international 
attention on events that local authorities are attempting to keep secret and deny an 
enemy access to their data or communications systems through hactivist attack or even
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cyber-terrorism. However, ultimately, the most dramatic effects of the internet and 
other new electronic communication technologies, as Castells notes, are "in the realm of 
symbolic politics, and in the development of issue-oriented mobilizations by groups 
and individuals outside the mainstream political system."125
125 Manuel Castells, The Power of Identity, vol. 2 of The Information Age: Economy, Society and Culture 
(Oxford: Blackwell, 1997), p. 352, quoted in Warf and Grimes, "Counterhegomonic discourses and the 
Internet."

